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A double-edged sword: The impact of institutions and political relations on the 
international market expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
Abstract 
This study examines how home country government involvement and host country 
institutions, as well as bilateral political relations, affect the post-entry market expansion of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in emerging and developing countries, and developed 
countries, using the case study method. The findings show that home country government 
involvement can either support or constrain SOEs’ subsequent market expansion. In emerging 
and developing countries, under-developed institutions create difficulties which can deter the 
market expansion of Chinese SOEs, whereas in developed host countries the challenges 
associated with unfamiliar institutions can be overcome through experiential learning. The 
impact of host country institutions on the market expansion of Chinese SOEs is contingent on 
political relations between host and home countries.  
Keywords: Chinese SOEs; internationalisation; post-entry market expansion; institutions; 
global political economy 
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1. Introduction 
One of the major trends characterizing the beginning of the 21st century is the rise of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging economies (EEs) such as China. By the end of 
2011, Chinese firms from non-financial sectors were engaged in outward FDI in 177 countries, 
including emerging and developing countries, and developed countries (MOC 2012). One 
particular phenomenon that has drawn the attention of both academics and practitioners is the 
important role played by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in outward FDI. In 2012, SOEs 
accounted for 90.5% of Chinese outward FDI flows (The Economist 2013).  
Despite the fact that SOEs have become a dominant force in Chinese outward FDI, little is 
known about their post-entry market expansion. Previous studies have examined factors affecting 
the emergence of Chinese MNEs and have found that Chinese outward FDI is influenced by a 
variety of firm, industry, and country-related factors (Buckley et al. 2007; Li and Ding, 2013; Lu, 
Liu and Wang 2011; Luo, Xue and Han 2010; Rui and Yip, 2008). The findings from existing 
studies have shed new light on this issue and enhanced our understanding of the characteristics 
of Chinese outward FDI. However, most existing studies have mainly focused on the motivation 
and entry mode selection of Chinese MNEs and have not explicitly examined their post-entry 
market expansion (e.g. Cui and Jiang 2010; Lu, Liu and Wang 2011). In particular, the role of 
the home country government and host country institutions in the subsequent market expansion 
of Chinese MNEs has been under-explored.  
The dominant position of SOEs in Chinese outward FDI indicates their vital role in the 
internationalisation of Chinese firms, and the importance of studying factors leading to their 
international success or failure. Hence, our research departs from previous studies by focusing on 
the post-entry market expansion of Chinese SOEs. In particular, drawing on the institution-based 
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view and global political economy perspective, our study aims to investigate how the home 
country government and host country institutions, as well as political relations between home 
and host countries, influence SOEs’ post-entry market expansion.  
The institution-based view has become an increasingly relevant and insightful approach 
when examining the internationalisation strategy and strategic outcomes of EE firms as it takes 
account of the interaction between institutions and internationalisation strategies (Meyer et al. 
2009; Peng, Wang and Jiang 2008; Wright et al. 2005). Hence it is appropriate to adopt the 
institution-based view to examine the role of the home country government and host country 
institutions in the market expansion of Chinese SOEs. We further draw on the global political 
economy perspective to explore the impact of bilateral political relations between host and home 
countries on the international market expansion of EE firms. This is particularly important in 
studying Chinese SOEs that are, by definition, assets of the home country government. Hence, 
SOEs’ objectives can be politically motivated and may be determined by the government’s 
consideration of China’s political and economic influence in the world. Such an affiliation can 
affect the way they are perceived by host country governments when investing overseas (Cui and 
Jiang 2012). In other words, the perception of Chinese SOEs by host country governments or 
government agencies is influenced by how these countries perceive China. Such a perception 
may be determined by the bilateral political relations between home and host countries and can 
consequently create institutional advantages or pose challenges to SOEs’ further market 
expansion in host countries.  
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, using Chinese SOEs 
as our research setting, this study enriches the institution-based view by drawing insights from 
the global political economy perspective and helps to enhance our understanding of the impact of 
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home and host institutions and the inter-relationship between them on the international market 
expansion of MNEs from EEs. By doing so, we move beyond a simplified application of the 
institution-based view within the boundary of individual countries by considering interaction 
between home and host countries through their political relations. We find that EE MNEs’ post-
entry expansion is not only influenced by the institutions of home and host countries, but also the 
inter-state political relation between them. Since these MNEs, especially SOEs, carry the identity 
of their home country, the political relation between home and host countries could determine 
whether they receive favourable or hostile treatment from host country institutions. Second, the 
home country government and its agencies play a complex role in SOEs’ post-entry market 
expansion. The influence of the home country government is not limited to providing 
governmental support as identified in existing studies (Lu, Liu and Wang 2011; Luo, Xue and 
Han 2010), but also extends to operational intervention in SOEs’ post-entry market expansion in 
a host country. Finally, this study serves the interests of international executives by providing a 
better understanding of the role of the home country government and host country institutions as 
well as the impact of international political relations on international expansion. Managers can 
take advantage of the institutional support from both home and host countries to avoid potential 
harm caused by institutional intervention. They can also lobby their home country government to 
build closer international political relations with host countries, which can be beneficial. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature background. Section 3 
introduces our research design and is followed by case evidence in Section 4. Section 5 discusses 
case findings, derives propositions, and presents limitations and implications. 
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2. Literature background 
This study draws on both the institution-based view and global political economy theory to 
explore how individual country institutions and inter-state relations affect the post-entry 
expansion of EE firms. Defined as the ‘rules of the game in a society’ (North 1990, 3), the idea 
that ‘institutions matter’ is hardly debatable, though ‘how institutions matter’ is of more interest 
and is still under-explored (Peng, Wang and Jiang 2008). It is widely recognized that MNEs are 
influenced by institutions in both home and host countries (Goldszmidt, Brito and Vasconcelos 
2009). On the one hand, firms are subject to regulations set by their home country on outward 
FDI, and on the other hand they have to act under the regulatory restrictions on inward FDI of 
the host countries. 
While prior research has examined the impact of home and host country institutions on 
internationalisation (Guler and Guillén 2010; Li and Ding, 2013; McGahan and Victer 2010; 
Pangarkar and Lim 2003; Schwens and Kabst 2011; Wan and Hoskisson 2003) and has found 
that contextual factors play an important role in overseas expansion, this line of research has 
largely focused on institutions within the boundary of individual countries (Kostova, Roth and 
Dacin 2008). Several researches have extended this line of research by exploring the role of 
institutional distance between home and host countries in order to provide a more holistic view 
(e.g. Gaur and Lu 2007; Berry, Guillen and Zhou, 2010). However, the concept of institutional 
distance only captures the differences between home and host country institutions without taking 
account of the impact of political relations between host and home countries. This suggests that 
the institution-based view in isolation is inadequate to pinpoint the role of contextual factors in 
the international expansion of EE firms (Kostova et al. 2008). 
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In order to fill this gap, we adopt global political economy as an additional lens to examine 
the role of political relations between home and host countries in the international expansion of 
EE firms. Traditionally, political economy is an interdisciplinary field studying how political 
institutions, the political environment and the economy influence each other (Drazen, 2000; 
Persson and Tabellini 2000). Political economists have long recognized the complex and 
dynamic inter-relationship between governments and businesses, where governments create 
legislation to regulate the behaviour of businesses while businesses attempt to shape 
governmental policies for their own interests (Henisz 2000; Kofele-Kale 1992; Rugman and 
Verbeke 1998). However, this perspective mainly focuses on the impact of governments within 
national boundaries and overlooks the inter-connections between nations. As the current world 
economy becomes more closely integrated than in any previous era, the global political economy 
has emerged as a new field drawing on both political economy and international relations 
literature to cross national boundaries (O’Brient and Williams 2010). 
2.1. The role of the home country government 
While prior research on MNEs from developed countries has mainly focused on 
institutions in MNEs’ host countries (Globerman and Shapiro 2003; Pangarkar and Lim 2003) 
with a few exceptions (Wan and Hoskisson 2003), the emergence of EE MNEs has attracted 
research interest into the role of the institutional characteristics of the MNEs’ home countries 
(McGahan and Victer 2010; Luo and Tung 2007; Witt and Lewin 2007; Lu, et al., 2014). 
Government intervention represents an important factor affecting the economic behaviour of EE 
firms. In particular, the home country governments of EEs play a more active role in the 
internationalisation strategies of EE firms than those of developed countries (Luo, Xue and Han 
2010). For example, China is in the process of transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
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market economy and the government has great power to influence firm strategies through 
regulations, policies and even direct state intervention. Since the implementation of the ‘Go 
Global’ strategy, the Chinese government has established a set of guidelines to promote outward 
FDI by simplifying administrative procedures, easing capital control, informing firms about 
investment opportunities, and reducing political and investment risks (Buckley et al. 2008). As 
latecomers, Chinese firms which lack international experience have an increased resource 
dependence on home country government support when venturing abroad (Cui and Jiang, 2012; 
Lu et al., 2014). However, limited studies have examined how government support and 
intervention affect EE firms’ post-entry market expansion. 
In addition to government direct involvement, institutions within EEs are undergoing rapid 
changes and these can represent challenges for domestic firms. Previous studies have found that 
EE firms have to deal with changing institutions, which can influence their performance both 
directly and indirectly (Holburn and Zelner 2010; Luo 2003). Originating in the context of 
under-developed and changing institutions in their home country, firms from EEs may have 
developed the capability of dealing with such institutional changes. Moreover, the capabilities 
developed from their home country experience can be exploited by these firms when entering a 
new market (McGahan and Victer 2010; Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). For example, Holburn 
and Zelner (2010) found that firms from home countries characterized by weaker institutional 
constraints on policymakers have higher organisational capability for managing political risk and 
are less sensitive to such risks in a host country. In the Chinese context, while supportive 
institutions provide resources needed for overseas success, burdensome government intervention 
also provides Chinese SOEs with a training ground for dealing with similar institutions in host 
countries, especially in other emerging and developing countries (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008).  
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2.2 Host country institutions 
The institutions created by the host country government and its agencies for foreign 
investments play an essential role in the success of MNEs (Pangarkar and Lim 2003). Host 
country institutions affect MNEs’ ability to access resources, as well as the overall risk of 
operations in the host country (Schwens and Kabst 2011). Specifically, well-established 
institutions help firms to reduce information and search costs associated with accessing critical 
resources for foreign operations, and facilitate knowledge acquisition (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). 
Effective market institutions in host countries make interactions between foreign and local firms 
predictable in product and factor markets, which help lower transaction costs and encourage 
sustained investment by foreign firms operating in host countries (Menard and Shirley 2008).  
Host country institutions associated with inward FDI represent the ‘rules of the game’ in 
the local market for all foreign firms, including financial and legal regulations. The host country 
government can build its country’s location advantages by improving its institutions in order to 
attract foreign firms who are looking to prosper in the local market (Guler and Guillén 2010). 
Well-established host country institutions help reduce the regulatory ambiguity associated with 
investment projects and so increase perceived business familiarity in host countries. This 
increased perceived business familiarity encourages firms to further expand. Researchers have 
found that changes in FDI policy influence MNE investment strategies, which affects investment 
outcomes (Peng 2002, 2003). Child, Chung and Davies (2003, 243) argue that ‘firms operating 
under more favourable external circumstances have a better chance of prospering’. Guler and 
Guillén (2010) found that host country institutions determine the attractiveness of that country 
for foreign firms and have a large impact on entry into new markets by foreign firms. Hence, 
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government policies and institutional arrangements have important implications for MNEs’ 
internationalisation outcomes (Chung and Beamish 2005; Gaur and Lu 2007; Pangarkar and Lim 
2003). 
 
2.3. Political relations and SOEs  
According to the global political economy perspective, the impact of one government’s 
policy is no longer limited by its national border because it can trigger a series of reactions from 
other countries which will consequently influence MNEs operating in those countries (Ravenhill, 
2008). As a result of the political relations between national states, the interaction between 
government and business has become ever more complex and dynamic in a global context as 
businesses have to deal not only with institutions in the host countries in which they are 
operating, but also with political environments shaped by the international political relations 
between the home and host countries (O’Brient and Williams 2010; Ravenhill 2008).  
This perspective is particularly relevant to the internationalisation of SOEs, given that 
SOEs are not only business enterprises but also often perceived as manifestations of national 
interests. State ownership of a firm naturally indicates political affiliation with its home country 
government (Cui and Jiang 2012). SOEs are unavoidably carrying more political identities than 
private firms and can be perceived by host countries not simply as business entities, but also as 
political actors (Globerman and Shapiro 2009; Zhang, Zhou and Ebbers 2011). Hence, the 
international expansion of SOEs may be viewed as politically motivated by some host countries 
(Cui and Jiang 2012; Lin 2010). Cui and Jiang (2012) argue that the image of the state power of 
China carried by Chinese SOEs creates difficulties for them when seeking to attain host country 
legitimacy. However, there is an implicit assumption in this argument which is that the image of 
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China carries a negative perception in the host country. This is not always the case in all the host 
countries in which Chinese SOEs operate, especially in some emerging and developing countries 
where the Chinese government has established close political relations and has provided foreign 
aid. This potentially positive image created by close political relations between home and host 
countries may represent an advantage for SOEs in emerging and developing host countries. In 
this regard, SOEs’ market expansion in a host country is not only affected by home government 
support and host country institutions, but also inter-state relations due to their quasi-political 
status.  SOEs are therefore more sensitive to and more likely to be affected by the international 
political relations between their home and host countries. As such, international political 
relations can influence the institutional response of host countries towards SOEs (Luo, Xue and 
Han 2010), which in turn can impact on SOEs’ further market expansion in host countries.  
 
3. Research design 
In our research we employed a multiple case-study method. Our intention was to establish 
a clearer understanding of the role of the home country government (i.e. China in this case) and 
host country institutions, as well as the political relations between home and host countries in the 
post-entry market expansion of Chinese SOEs. We used this method because multiple cases can 
serve as discrete experiments and enable the researcher to make replications, contrasts and 
extensions to the emerging theory (Yin 2003).  
As suggested by Yin (2003) and Silverman (2010), we chose cases where the length and 
scale of internationalisation should be sufficient for us to explore the internationalisation 
outcomes and post-entry overseas activities. However, we allowed for heterogeneity of outward 
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FDI in terms of host countries, business markets and operational modes, in order to compare and 
contrast case evidence. 
The study included evidence from five Chinese SOEs (Table 1): the first is a white goods 
manufacturing company with overseas manufacturing plants in Europe, North America, Asia, 
Oceania and Africa; the second is a leading telecommunications company with overseas 
subsidiaries in Asia, Europe and America; the third is a trade company with 14 overseas 
subsidiaries, one trade center, and eight overseas representative offices in Asia, Latin America 
and Africa; the fourth is a construction company with 11 overseas subsidiaries in Asia, Africa 
and Europe; the fifth is a telecommunications company with six subsidiaries in Asia, North 
America and Europe. Table 2 further illustrates the expansion strategies adopted by the five 
SOEs in both emerging and developing countries, and developed countries. 
INSERT TABLE 1 & 2 HERE 
We used two criteria to identify appropriate respondents: a) they must be knowledgeable 
about the firm and its competitive environment, and b) they must be familiar with international 
strategies and international operations. Hence, directors of international business departments at 
headquarters were considered to be the most appropriate respondents. Table 2 provides the list of 
managers interviewed for this study.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in this study in order to encourage respondents 
to give their opinions on how institutions and international political relations influence post-entry 
market expansion. Two rounds of interviews were conducted in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
This longitudinal approach enabled us to understand the impact of changing external 
environments on SOEs’ overseas market expansion. In total, we conducted 14 interviews, each 
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of which lasted approximately two hours. All interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed 
using Atlas software. We further sought information from annual reports and media coverage on 
the case companies’ overseas operations to enrich and triangulate our data collection. The key 
themes that we focused on during the analysis of our data included the role of the home country 
government (i.e. China) and host country institutions, as well as the political relations between 
the home and host countries and the effect of this relationship on the market expansion of 
Chinese SOEs. 
We conducted within-case and cross-case analysis focusing on examining how host 
country institutions and the home country government involvement, as well as the political 
relations, impact the post-entry market expansion of SOEs (Miles and Huberman 1994). The 
within-case analysis provided a preliminary understanding of the role of these factors in any 
subsequent market expansion of SOEs in host countries. Building on this, we conducted cross-
case analyses to compare and contrast the similarities and differences across cases. Such analyses 
enabled us to identify common features or patterns that emerged across cases, and this helped 
strengthen internal validity (Yin 2003).  
Figure 1 provides an overview of our data structure. We adopted a three-step process to 
analyse the data (Gioia et al. 2013). In the first-order analysis, we identified 11 codes using the 
interviewees’ own terms. In the second-order analysis, we identified five theoretical themes. In 
the third-order analysis, we classified these categories into the three key themes which have a 
profound impact on Chinese SOEs’ overseas expansion.  
Insert Figure 1 near Here 
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4. Findings 
4.1. Home country government involvement 
The case evidence reveals that home country government involvement plays a role in both 
helping and hindering Chinese SOEs’ post-entry market expansion. The international expansion 
of these SOEs is financially and politically supported by the Chinese government. 
“The central government provided some valuable information and resources for our 
market expansion, such as the Analysis of Investment Risks by Country report published in 2008. 
This kind of support is important for us as we have limited experience in terms of overseas 
market expansion.” 
                                                                  ----Firm E  
All our interviewees stated that when investing abroad Chinese SOEs were financially 
supported by preferential loans offered by the central policy bank, the Export-Import Bank of 
China (EIBC). Cheap financial capital enlarges the resource pool, which can be used to support 
overseas subsidiaries. The Chinese government and its agencies also provide information about 
potential host countries through local embassies, and publish guidelines on overseas investments. 
Such support from the home country government, to a large extent, helps mitigate the challenges 
of Chinese SOEs in host markets and enables SOEs to gain local knowledge without involving 
experiential learning.  
Furthermore, SOEs are the preferred contractors for foreign aid projects funded by the 
Chinese government. In fact, some SOEs enter foreign markets as the contractors of such aid 
projects. They subsequently expand into those markets, mostly in developing countries, by both 
exploring business opportunities and fulfilling foreign aid contracts funded by the Chinese 
government. Very often, the label ‘foreign aider’ helps SOEs to build a good reputation in the 
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local market and this local acceptance in turn enables SOEs to explore more business 
opportunities. 
“However, the government can also cause us many problems because the government and 
its agencies can interfere with our decision-making which really slows down our response to 
potential expansion opportunities.” 
                                                                  ----Firm E  
The business activities of SOEs are under surveillance by government officials, which 
often results in a high level of bureaucracy and inefficiency, hindering SOEs’ overseas market 
expansion. Firm D provided an interesting example illustrating the effect of government 
intervention. The central government set a standard allowance for overseas travel expenses in the 
1980s which expatriates cannot survive on in the 21st century. SOE officials who travelled 
abroad had to fill in the standardised expenses claim form upon return and much time and energy 
was diverted to fulfilling this requirement. In 2003, Firm D had to go through a lengthy 
bureaucratic process to obtain the institutional approval to reset the allowance in order to bring it 
up-to-date. 
In addition, the home country government, or its agencies, have a profound influence on 
SOE managers’ mindset. The State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
has explicit requirements for the performance of SOEs’ overseas investments, especially after the 
financial crisis. The SASAC is now paying more attention to the financial performance of 
overseas investments. Since the financial crisis, the SASAC has cautioned all SOEs about 
international investment and required the management team to take full responsibility for any 
international investment loss.  
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“The political and career future of SOE managers is directly related to the performance of 
the firm. Managers tend to consider whether they can meet the finance targets, which are 
focused on now rather than growth in the future. This kind of mindset may discourage them from 
taking risks by seeking further market expansion” 
                                                                  ----Firm B  
“Managers are extremely cautious and pay great attention to financial performance in the 
short term rather than in the long term. Therefore, we focus mainly on generating positive cash 
flows from existing contracts rather than investing further in market expansion which would be 
more beneficial to the long term development of the subsidiaries.” 
                                                                  ----Firm C  
Because the future career of managers is based on evaluation by the SASAC, the emphasis 
on finance performance by the SASAC has encouraged managers to focus on short-term returns 
on capital rather than on the long-term development of overseas subsidiaries. Managers focus 
their managerial attention on generating a positive cash flow because they may put their jobs at 
risk if they cannot improve the financial performance of subsidiaries within a short time frame. 
The emphasis on financial performance overshadows the importance of activities increasing 
future enterprise value, such as market expansion. This shift in managerial mindset leads to cut- 
backs in investment in further market expansion. 
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4.2. Host country institutions 
4.2.1. Emerging and developing countries 
Chinese SOEs with relatively little international experience are in a comparatively 
vulnerable position in host countries when they face challenges associated with the ambiguity 
and unfamiliarity of overseas institutions in other emerging and developing countries.  
“In Africa, without host country government support, projects with an investment of over 
$10 million are unlikely to succeed. Hence, gaining host country government support is the most 
crucial condition for our post-entry expansion in African countries. Actually, this aspect is quite 
similar to how we operate in China” 
                                                                  ----Firm D  
In order to counter balance the negative effect of such ambiguous and unfamiliar 
institutions, SOEs pay particular attention to the host country’s policies and try to build a close 
connection with local governments to gain institutional support. SOEs that have been 
beneficiaries of close relationships with governments at home, understand the importance of 
governmental support when regulations are ambiguous and institutions are unpredictable. For 
example, Firm D often invites the local government to become shareholders, even if the firm 
itself already has adequate financial resources. By doing so, Firm D can relatively easily obtain 
local government support or approval when proposing further expansion. SOEs often engage 
with local governments or government agencies in order to become local SOEs. In turn, local 
governments provide the protection and favourable treatment that SOEs enjoy in their home 
country. With the support and protection from local governments, SOEs can much more easily 
navigate in the local market, explore potential opportunities and expand their investments. 
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However, although Chinese SOEs can mitigate the risks caused by unfamiliar and unstable 
host country institutions through collaborating with local governments, in some cases SOEs are 
very cautious about taking on further business opportunities in these countries in addition to 
foreign aid projects assigned by the Chinese government. This is mainly because of unstable 
political environments; for example, the governmental policy towards foreign investments may 
take a U-turn when there is a change of regime. This is particularly true in emerging and 
developing countries where complex institutions are accompanied by political instability. 
“In some African countries, the political environment is not stable. The government’s 
regulations can change overnight. This poses a serious risk and creates great uncertainty to our 
investment so we are very cautious about market expansion in these countries.” 
                                                                  ----Firm C  
Unstable and unpredictable institutions increase the difficulty and uncertainty of expanding 
SOEs’ market positions in host countries, and reduced their willingness to commit to further 
expansion in these countries. 
4.2.2. Developed countries 
Developed countries generally have well-established and detailed regulations and legal 
systems, thus drawing boundaries within which firms operate. The Chinese SOEs that enter these 
countries face the challenge of collecting information on relevant regulations and understanding 
such regulations. They have to invest a huge amount of time and resources in order to acquire 
knowledge about local regulations and rules.  
“We realised later that there was a rule for everything. We didn’t expect them 
(subsidiaries) to make any profit for a couple of years despite of the heavy investment. Their 
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responsibilities were to gather information and gain knowledge about the host country in order 
to build a solid foundation for later expansion.” 
                                                                  ----Firm A  
Our interviewees realise that in developed countries regulations are rigorously enforced by 
governments and their agencies, which provides a level playing field for all firms competing in 
the market. In such circumstances SOEs have to change any perception about gaining special 
treatment and legitimacy by manipulating regulations and building special relationships with 
local governments.  
“At home, we are the ‘big brother’ in the industry. We are different from anyone else. But 
in America, we are the same as everybody else. We change our position from rule-makers to 
followers. Sometimes, this is difficult to swallow. What I mean is that we can’t, or it’s impossible 
to find ways, to manipulate policy or regulations here through which we can gain advantages or 
opportunities in further market expansion as we often do at home.” 
                                                                  ----Firm E  
Chinese SOEs have always enjoyed a superior position in the domestic market. The special 
bond between SOEs and the Chinese government enables SOEs to gain various privileges in the 
Chinese market. They not only receive special support and preferential treatment from the 
government but are also involved in the legislative process and have the ability to influence rules. 
In many cases, they are able to change rules in their favor. However, when they enter developed 
countries where there are well-established institutions and properly-enforced legal systems, 
Chinese SOEs find that they need to operate under a set of rules which they are most likely 
unfamiliar with and which are enforced rigorously in the local market. These SOEs no longer 
have the lobbying power to change rules, and discard those that may cause obstacles. Therefore, 
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at the early stage of SOEs’ investment, they often face difficulties when they try to manipulate 
rules in ways that they have been doing at home. It takes SOEs a long time to understand local 
institutions and learn to play by the rules, which slows down their expansion in these countries. 
Therefore, at an early stage of investment, subsidiaries in developed countries tend to expand 
very slowly, if at all. 
However, although regulations and laws on foreign investment or foreign firms in 
developed countries are very detailed and complex, they are consistent and mostly independent 
of governmental changes, thus reducing uncertainty related to political risk which SOEs need to 
confront in many emerging and developing countries. Therefore, once SOEs have passed the 
early learning stage in developed countries, and understand the rules and regulations, they can 
carry out their market expansion whenever business opportunities arise in host countries.  
4.3. Political relations between the home and host countries 
In addition to the institutions of a host country, the political relations between the host 
country government and the Chinese government also affect SOEs’ expansion. This is 
particularly important in emerging and developing countries where market-based mechanisms 
are still under-developed, and governments more frequently intervene in foreign investments 
than in developed countries. Although the complexity of a host country’s institutions can cause 
serious problems for SOEs’ overseas investments, especially in emerging and developing 
countries, a close long-term political relationship between China and the host country can reduce 
the uncertainty associated with ambiguous regulations. 
“We found that, by and large, political relations affect economic relations when we 
operate in foreign countries. For example, China offers foreign aid to many African countries 
with whom it has good political relations. Subsequently, as foreign aid contractors we receive 
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preferential treatment from local governments. Our senior management team realised we need to 
learn more about the political relations between China and host countries, and understand the 
implications of such relationships for our overseas expansion.” 
                                                                   ----Firm A  
“In such countries, we receive favourable treatment from the local government and local 
people. When we run into bureaucratic difficulties, we can even ask the Chinese Embassy to 
negotiate with the local government since the host country government is more likely to listen to 
the opinions of the Chinese government. We feel more comfortable and confident about 
expanding our business in these countries.” 
                                                                  ----Firm E  
In particular, the interviewees felt that SOEs were carrying the identity of the Chinese 
government. A close and friendly political relationship between China and host countries helps 
SOEs to avoid the hostile attitude of local people and the damaging intervention of host 
governments. This creates a more favourable investment environment that can lead to more 
opportunities for SOEs to further expand in the local market.  
Compared with the favourable treatment from host governments in emerging and 
developing countries, thanks to the close political relations between China and the host countries, 
SOEs face more challenges in developed countries, which often have more tense political 
relations with China.  
“These countries have much lower tolerance and acceptance of us than those with whom 
China has better political relations. We are not seen as an independent enterprise but part of the 
Chinese government which could pose a security threat to them (host countries). Therefore, we 
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cannot get into the B2C market. We can only do B2B, and the businesses we serve are limited to 
other Chinese companies investing in these countries.” 
                                                                  ----Firm E  
In these countries, not only do SOEs lose their lobbying power because of the rigorous 
legal system, but they also face significantly higher hurdles due to ideological differences, 
especially in sensitive industries related to national security, such as infrastructure. Both Firm B 
and Firm E mentioned their concerns about the negative perception held by some host country 
governments and the further scrutiny needed to approve their expansion because of their political 
identity.  
 
5. Discussion 
Our findings reveal that both home country government involvement and host country 
institutions have a profound and complex impact on SOEs’ market expansion in host countries, 
and in addition the political relations between home and host countries influence the market 
expansion of SOEs. Their political identity represents both advantages and disadvantages when 
they operate and seek further expansion overseas thanks to the different political relations 
between China and host countries. In this section, we will start with our propositions derived 
from the case evidence followed by discussing of each proposition.   
5.1. Propositions  
5.1.1. The role of home country government   
Proposition 1: Home country government support in terms of finance and information 
can help to mitigate the challenges and compensate for the lack of international 
experience by SOEs in host countries, but excessive state intervention with business 
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operations leads to low efficiency and low commitment by SOEs to further market 
expansion.  
It is well documented that SOEs’ strategies and strategic outcomes are largely shaped by 
government policies and direct intervention of the state (Lin and Germain 2003; Wei, 2007), and 
there is a special relationship between Chinese SOEs and the government. SOEs are supported 
by the government and often enjoy favourable treatment from the government, which is not 
available to private companies. This preferential treatment also applies to SOEs’ 
internationalisation. For example, Chinese SOEs are financially supported by preferential loans 
offered by the central policy bank, EIBC, when investing abroad. The Chinese government also 
provides information about potential host countries through local embassies, and it publishes 
guidelines on overseas investments. This support helps mitigate the disadvantages of Chinese 
SOEs being late comers in host markets. Moreover, Chinese SOEs are often the preferred 
contractors of Chinese foreign aid projects in developing countries. This liaison provides 
Chinese SOEs with opportunities to explore the host markets, to generate stable cash flows and 
to prepare for further market expansion. This finding is consistent with previous studies showing 
that the Chinese government plays a vital role in the internationalisation process of SOEs and 
overseas success (Lu, Liu and Wang 2011; Luo, Xue and Han 2010). 
However, our findings further extend previous studies by revealing the complex role 
played by the Chinese government. While SOEs enjoy the privilege of access to valuable 
resources and information coming from the home country government, they are also subjected to 
the supervision and restraint of the Chinese government. Therefore, compared to private firms, 
Chinese SOEs have to deal with more bureaucratic interference, as the government and its 
agencies often exert their power to intervene in SOEs’ overseas investment projects (Chen, 2008). 
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In particular, the Chinese government and the SASAC have added involvement in the daily 
operations of Chinese SOEs, rather than just setting the institutional environment. Many 
operational regulations set by the government are still in operation after SOEs become 
independent enterprises. These regulations, set a few decades ago, are out-of-date and 
incompatible with the modern business world. Many Chinese SOEs suffer from low efficiency 
caused by the constraints of these regulations as they are not able to independently exploit their 
existing resources for further market expansion.  
Furthermore, the SASAC set expectations for the international performance of Chinese 
SOEs. After the financial crisis and the following economic downturn, the SASAC cautioned 
SOEs against any financial loss of international investments. SOEs are now focusing more on 
generating positive cash flows from existing projects and cutting back on investment towards 
future development and expansion as SOE managers try to meet the financial requirements set by 
the SASAC in order to protect their own careers. This has led to a reduced incentive for SOEs to 
commit more investment in further market expansion.  
5.1.2. The role of institutions in host countries  
Proposition 2a: In emerging and developing countries, SOEs can draw upon their past 
experience of operating in their home country with under-developed institutions to lobby 
local governments for further market expansion. However, instability and uncertainties 
associated with institutional changes slow SOEs’ further market expansion. 
Proposition 2b: In developed countries, SOEs face mindset challenges rather than 
operational challenges due to a lack of experience in dealing with such institutions. 
However, once they understand local institutions and adapt their behaviour accordingly, 
then further market expansion can speed up.  
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When investing in foreign countries, Chinese SOEs are subject to a series of unfamiliar 
legal, financial and industrial regulations which may be markedly different from those of their 
home country and which represent the ‘rules of the game’ in the local market for all foreign 
firms. Besides the tangible policies and regulations set by the host country government and its 
agencies, SOEs also need to deal with the intangible underlying rules of the local markets, such 
as local customs, culture and corruption, especially in some emerging and developing countries 
where the institutions are underdeveloped or unstable (Schwens and Kabst 2011; Wright et al. 
2005). A lack of familiarity with the unwritten rules in host countries causes many difficulties for 
Chinese SOEs’ subsidiaries, especially when they are newcomers in a host country. Therefore, 
Chinese SOEs have to prepare to operate with different institutions and be willing to invest extra 
resources to gather the information necessary for local institutional adaptation. This experiential 
learning process can slow down the local market expansion of SOEs.  
It is evident that there is a fundamental difference between developed countries and 
emerging and developing countries in terms of how the dissimilarity in institutional settings 
influences SOEs’ market expansion. Chinese SOEs are often able to settle more quickly into the 
institutional environments of emerging and developing host countries at the early stages of 
investment. They can draw upon their accumulated experiences of dealing with complex and 
under-developed institutions in order to gain their foothold in local markets. This confirms the 
assertion proposed by previous research that experience in dealing with ambiguous institutions at 
home can be exploited when entering a new market (Holburn and Zelner 2010; Morck, Yeung 
and Zhao 2008). However, SOEs also have to prepare themselves for the instability of local 
institutions in these countries. This type of risk is caused by unfavourable changes in the 
government of a host country, or in the policies issued by this regime, and thus is uncontrollable 
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by individual firms (Cuypers and Martin 2010). It poses a serious threat to Chinese SOEs’ 
overseas investments and reduces their willingness to commit to further market expansion. 
Therefore, although Chinese SOEs can draw on their previous experience in dealing with 
complex and ambiguous institutions back in China, the instability of local institutions eventually 
leads to slow market expansion in emerging and developing host countries.  
Institutional differences between China and developed countries with well-established and 
market-based institutions have been recognized as one of the proposed motives driving Chinese 
outward FDI (Luo and Tung 2007; Witt and Lewin 2007). However, such differences pose 
serious challenges to the post-entry market expansion of SOEs. In addition to the extra resources 
and time invested in gaining familiarity, SOEs have to accept the reality that there is a level 
playing field in the market and they cannot expect that they will get the favourable treatment that 
they receive at home. This requires SOEs to play by the rules, which not only brings the benefit 
of market-based institutions but also creates difficulties and inconvenience due to strict 
regulations. Case evidence shows that in developed host countries Chinese SOEs need to learn 
how to conduct market-oriented exchanges by following the rules of the game. This requires 
managers to change their managerial mindsets. They cannot transfer home country practices into 
these host countries. Instead they need to develop market-based capabilities. In other words, 
Chinese SOEs have to invest resources to adapt to the institutional environment in developed 
host countries. Although the new institutional settings in developed host countries can cause 
discomfort and delays to the subsequent market expansion of SOEs, it can be overcome by 
experiential learning. Once SOEs understand local institutions, they generally find it 
straightforward to expand in the local market as there are clear rules to follow. 
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5.1.3. The role of political relations between home and host countries 
Proposition 3a: A close political relation between a host country and home country helps 
to mitigate the impact of uncertainty and the risks associated with complex host country 
institutions on SOEs’ further market expansion. 
Proposition 3b: Political tensions and ideological differences between a host country and 
home country represent additional barriers to SOEs’ further market expansion in 
developed host countries.    
According to the global political economy perspective, political relations between two 
countries have a great impact on the economic partnership between the two countries in general, 
and MNEs in particular. Many emerging and developing countries have received foreign aid 
from the Chinese government because of their political relations with China, and SOEs are often 
the contractors who carry out these foreign aid projects. The political identity of Chinese SOEs 
can earn them favourable treatment from host country governments. This positive attitude 
towards China and Chinese SOEs can often compensate for the uncertainties and risks caused by 
unstable and unfamiliar local institutions, because a friendly bilateral relation and a positive 
attitude by local governments towards Chinese SOEs often leads to preferential treatment. Such a 
close relation between the Chinese government and host country government helps to reduce the 
uncertainty and operational risks associated with under-developed institutions in these countries 
(Luo, Xue and Han 2010; UNCTAD 2007). This is particularly the case when Chinese SOEs run 
into the hurdle of local bureaucracy and institutional barriers. In such cases, SOEs can turn to the 
Chinese government for help and request the home government to put political pressure on the 
host country government in order to achieve economic objectives. This finding is in line with 
previous studies which find that bilateral treaties improve the development of trust among 
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countries which in turn helps MNEs resolve disputes and contributes to their further expansion in 
host countries (Desbordes and Vicard 2009; Rangan and Sengul 2009).  
The findings further reveal that in some developed countries SOEs face discrimination in 
national security-related industries due to ideological differences between their home and the 
host country government. Because of their association with the Chinese government, some host 
country governments are concerned about the potential political motivation behind SOEs’ 
investment, and therefore reluctant to award SOEs equal economic status as with other private 
firms. This contradicts existing studies which show that foreign firms are likely to be granted 
national treatment in a developed host country (Moeller et al. 2013). This may be because the 
existing literature focused only on institutions within the boundary of individual countries, and 
ignored the impact of political relations between host and home countries on firms operating in a 
host country. By drawing on the global political economy perspective, our findings broaden the 
impact of local institutions beyond the boundary of a host country. It is shown that the perception 
of MNEs by host country governments is influenced not only by the relationship between MNEs 
and their home country, but also by the political relations between the home and host countries.  
5.2. Contributions  
The main theoretical contributions of this study are threefold. First, we draw on both the 
institution-based view and the global political economy perspective to explore the impact of 
institutions and political relations on the post-entry market expansion of Chinese SOEs. Prior 
research based on the institution-based view mainly focused on the influence of institutions 
within the boundary of individual countries. However, as globalization intensifies, MNEs are not 
only affected by the institutional environment of both home and host countries, but also the 
political relations between host countries and home country. The political relations can either 
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hinder firms’ further market expansion or firms can exploit such relations to gain favourable 
institutional support in host countries. Therefore, the global political economy perspective is an 
important complement to the institution-based view when studying the international market 
expansion of SOEs. Incorporating this perspective into the institution-based view enables us to 
broaden the impact of institutional environments of both host and home countries in the context 
of political relations between countries.  
Second, by incorporating the global political dimension to the institution-based view, this 
study sheds new light on how institutions matter. Specifically, this study moves away from 
investigating the institutional motivation of Chinese FDI (e.g. Cui and Jiang, 2012; Deng, 2009), 
and enriches our understanding of how contextual factors at macro level, including home country 
government and institutions of different types in host countries, influence the post-entry market 
expansion of SOEs. Home-country government involvement has much more complex effects on 
Chinese SOEs’ expansion in the international market than simply providing support and our 
study moves beyond prior studies on the supportive role of home country government. Through 
the global political economy dimension, we have found that home country government acts as a 
double-edged sword which can both support and hinder SOEs’ market expansion in a host 
country through direct intervention and political relations with the host country. Thus, our study 
adds a new dimension regarding the impact of home country governments on outward FDI from 
EEs.  
Finally, our study goes beyond existing research which tended to treat host countries as a 
homogenous group in terms of their reaction to SOEs, or did not differentiate the responses of 
different types of host countries to SOEs, and assumed that all host countries responded to SOEs 
in the same way (Cui and Jiang 2012). Our findings show that the institutions of emerging and 
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developing and developed host countries have different influences on the market expansion of 
Chinese SOEs. Such an impact is also channeled through political relations between a host 
country and the Chinese government. This aspect has been largely neglected. Hence, we make an 
important contribution to the existing literature and call for more studies to further delineate the 
impact of institutions of emerging and developing and developed host countries by taking 
account of the complex interface between institutions and political relations.  
5.3 Limitations and future studies  
We acknowledge the limitations of this study and that further research is required. This 
study attempts to take the first step to explore the effect of political relations on EE firms’ post-
entry expansion by using case studies. Future studies could extend this line of research by 
gathering a wider source of data and empirically testing the findings of this study. Furthermore, 
this study focuses on the political relations between host and home country only, but does not 
take account of the impact of economic relations. An important avenue for future research, 
therefore, can be the exploration of the influence of both political and economic relations 
between home and host countries on market expansion. We have explored how the home country 
government and host country institutions, as well as political relations, affect market expansion 
of SOEs. Future studies should examine how these factors affect the financial performance of EE 
firms. In particular, it would be interesting to expand the impact of institutions of the home 
country beyond government involvement.    
5.4. Implications 
The findings of this study are particularly relevant to SOE managers. SOE managers from 
China or other similar institutional environments need to be aware of the different impact of 
institutions in developed and developing host countries. In emerging and developing countries, 
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under-developed institutions represent greater challenges and can be serious barriers to the 
further expansion of SOEs. In such countries, SOEs need to build a close relationship with the 
host country government and draw on the relations between Chinese and host country 
governments in order to reduce risks caused by unstable institutions. In developed countries, 
initially, SOE managers need to change their managerial mindsets and develop market-based 
capabilities in order to adapt to host country institutions and behave accordingly. Once managers 
pass this learning stage they will be able to concentrate on market expansion rather than being so 
concerned about institutional stability. 
Furthermore, managers of MNEs need to pay attention to not only the institutions of both 
host and home country but also the political relations between the two countries. This is because 
the perception of MNEs in a host country is influenced by the political relations between host 
and home country. Therefore, MNEs can play up their national identities in host countries having 
good relations with their home-country, while playing down their ties with the home government 
in host countries having less favourable political relations with their home-country, or avoiding 
investment in such countries altogether. 
The findings have further implications for local firms in host countries where Chinese 
SOEs have overseas investments. They can take the opportunity to develop good relationships 
with Chinese SOEs. This relationship can create mutual benefits for both sides. Chinese SOEs 
can gain much needed help in understanding local institutions and settling in the local market. 
Local firms can exploit this relationship in the Chinese market by taking advantage of the special 
relationship between SOEs and the Chinese government.  
The policy implications of this study are mainly twofold. First, if host country governments 
desire to attract Chinese OFDI and subsequent investments, they should provide more guidelines 
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to help Chinese firms familiarise themselves with local institutions. For emerging and 
developing countries in particular, stable institutions and positive bilateral relations with China 
can reduce the risks perceived by Chinese firms and increase their commitment to further market 
expansion. Second, the Chinese government should reduce its intervention in SOEs’ overseas 
operations and give more autonomy and flexibility to the management team of SOEs in decision 
making. It can help SOEs’ overseas market expansion by establishing positive international 
relations with host countries and provide better protection for SOEs in some volatile markets. 
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Table 1 Description of the Sample Cases 
Case Industry Founded 
State 
Ownership  
Internation
alisation1 
Entry/Operation Modes 
No. of Overseas 
Subsidiary 
Registered Asset 
(RMB million) 
A Manufacturing 1969 100%  1996 Greenfield; JV; M&A 14  60 
B Telecommunication 20002 100%  2000 Greenfield 5  22,040 
C Trade 1959 100% 1994 Greenfield; JV; M&A 23  101.4 
D Construction 1950 100% 1995 Greenfield; JV 11 31.7 
E Telecommunication 20002 100% 2000 Greenfield; JV; M&A 6 30,000 
Note: 1 The year when the first overseas subsidiary was set up. 2 The year when the two enterprises were separated from the former. 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunication. 
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Table 2 Current overseas expansion strategies of the Sample Cases 
 Emerging and developing countries Developed countries 
Firm A Gradually set up manufacturing plants 
according to local institutional environment, 
resource availability and labour skills. 
Set up research centre and manufacturing 
plants to serve local needs and raise market 
share. 
Firm B Set up local representative office to seek 
collaboration possibilities with local partners. 
Serve expatriate customers and gather 
information to prepare for future 
expansion. 
Firm C Invest in countries with good relations with 
China and great market growth potential. 
At information collection stage. 
Firm D Serve as foreign aid contractor for Chinese 
government to enter foreign markets and 
explore further business opportunities to 
expand in local markets. 
Develop internal management capabilities 
to better manage further expansion. 
Firm E Choose countries with long-term good 
relations with China as expansion targets. 
Set up research centre and representative 
office to collect more information for 
future expansion. 
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Table 3 Description of Interviewees 
Case Respondent Position 
A Interviewee A: Director of Strategy Development Department 
B Interviewee B: Director of International Business Department 
C • Interviewee C1: Uganda Subsidiary CEO (former director of International Department) 
• Interviewee C2: Director of International Department (first round only) 
• Interviewee C3: Executive manager of International Department (first round only) 
D Interviewee D: Director of International Department  
E • Interviewee E1: Director of International Department  
• Interviewee E2: Vice-director of International Department 
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Figure 1: Overview of data structure 
 
1st Order Codes 2nd Order Codes Theoretical Categories 
• Cheap finance capital from state banks 
• Provide local information about host countries 
 
• Build a good relationship with local governments to win 
support & protection 
• Slow down expansion because of the unstable environment 
 
• Invest to acquire knowledge about complex local institutions 
• Change existing mindset of receiving favourable treatment 
• Consistent & stable institutional environment favours further 
expansion 
 
• Receive favourable treatment because of being Chinese SOEs 
in developing countries 
• Hurdles created by ideology differences in developed 
countries 
Resource support 
Political influence 
Ambiguous & unpredictable 
EE environment 
Well-established institutions 
in developed countries 
Identity of the Chinese 
government 
Home country 
government support 
Host country 
institutions 
Political 
relations 
 
• Foreign aider reputation from contracting foreign aid projects 
• Bureaucratic control & constrain from SASAC 
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